

[SE9-CV-1] New START I

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Full Summary

Dr. Vladimir Ivanov began the session with a discussion on what the new START treaty means from a Russian perspective, however, he prefaced his remarks are not any official Russian position, only his reflections after many consultations with many experts in the field. He started, by noting that new START shows a general evolution of Russian strategic military thinking beyond a posture of Mutually Assured Destruction. This evolution is based on a growing gap between the nuclear weapon (NW) capabilities of the United States, NATO countries, and the Russian Federation. He believes that numerical parity is now less important for the Russian leadership. More important are the benefits of structural advances in Russia's nuclear potential. During negotiations of the new START treaty, Russia was keen on these structural differences, and some other well-known concerns were discussed. During negotiations, for instance, Russian negotiators explicitly expressed concerns over three large issues, the first, being the possible deployment of a U.S. global missile defense system. To address Russian concerns over this potential deployment, the new START treaty includes text that establishes a link between missile defense and strategic offensive arms. Second, Russia expressed concerns over the United States' re-loading capacities. Russia would certainly like a means to limit these capacities. The third Russian concern centered upon the potential U.S. deployment of conventionally-equipped strategic launchers. To address this particular concern, language was included in the new START preamble stating equivalencies between conventional and nuclear strategic arms.

Dr. Ivanov then elaborated upon how the parameters of the new START treaty demonstrate the complexity of Russia's approach to a strategic balance. First, launchers for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are taken into account under the treaty- and this applies not only to those that are operationally-ready, but those intended for training as well. Second, limits and accounting measures cover all types of ICBMs and SLBMs- regardless of whether they have conventional or nuclear warheads. Third, heavy bombers can be converted to conventional bombers through stipulations within the treaty; and there are special procedures available to make sure these bombers cannot be converted back. Finally, the limits of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads encompass conventional- and nuclear-armed SLBMs, ICBMs and

heavy bombers. Interestingly, however, is the potential for an increased numbers of deployed warheads beyond this limit. This is because under the new START treaty, one heavy bomber counts for only one warhead, however a heavy bomber could potentially carry more than one warhead, and therefore stretch beyond the treaty limits.

Most significant, according to Dr. Ivanov, is that by the new START treaty, each party has the right to define the structure of its nuclear forces- as long as these forces abide by the treaties limits. This means that Russia has now been freed from the burdens of the START 1 treaty. However, it is important to consider whether Russia can maintain strategic parity given the new and different counting rules. For instance, Russia has a fewer number of launchers than established by treaty (700 are established in the treaty, whereas Russia, in 2010, had 560 launchers). Russia will need to replace aging launchers, and potentially increasing the total number of launchers by 140. Both activities would be a considerable expense, and it is not clear if Russia will see the need to raise these numbers, or come to terms with the disparity. Many specialists think it's possible that Russia will indeed not raise the number of launchers in order to reach the upper limits set forth in new START. Finally, to have further progress on strategic arms control the United States and Russian Federation, as well as other countries willing to join, will need to consider the complexity of strategic forces and also where tactical NWs fit into these forces. He noted that currently, we do not have transparent model calculations of what numbers are needed to keep the level of strategic forces at a level of minimum deterrence. This is due to the fact that such models and calculations are classified by both sides. Additionally, each side may have completely different approaches in these calculations. He believes that we may need to initiate a process of bringing forth these calculations to the public, in order to have a more transparent system on what we mean by minimum deterrence.

Dr. Ivanov ended, by commenting on an issue not touched upon in this treaty, but one that is an important contributor to the overall global strategic balance. This issue is the continuing lack of discussions regarding tactical NWs. It is important to recognize Russia's continuing reluctance to discuss tactical NWs, as it hints towards its desire to keep its tactical NW superiority. Dr. Ivanov believes that Russia will likely continue to refrain from discussing this issue until U.S. tactical NWs are removed from Western Europe. He continued by noting that in future strategic arms control negotiations, a multi-national effort will likely become appropriate, and that tactical NWs will need to be discussed.

General Jonathan George postulated that the new START treaty is more symbolic than substantive, and that the United States and Russia were both going to naturally settle on the course of action that was undertaken in the treaty. For instance, he noted that the counting limits established by the treaty are not especially surprising. Rather, they reflect reflects the

realities for what both sides already had, or what each side projected it would be going towards in the near future. Funding and budget constraints have impacted the sizes of each side's nuclear forces. He noted that the treaty did succeed in moving beyond old treaties' counting rules that have become antiquated. Beyond this, he described the new START treaties critical role established through its symbolic nature. It reveals a mutual goal that the United States and Russia (who are owners of over 90% of the world's nuclear war fighting capabilities) are seeking to achieve a prosperous and secure global future. More specifically, it demonstrates that the United States and Russia are intent on working together in addressing the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems. This task is critical to improving global security.

General George then reflected on the differences between two concepts: capabilities and intent. From a military perspective, he noted that intent is easily changed, whereas capabilities are not. Militaries therefore typically prepare to address capabilities rather than intent. In light of this, he considers the dramatic changes in relations that have occurred over the past 30 years between Russia and the United States. Unlike 30 years ago, the United States and Russia are no longer immediate threats to the other. We see the future as bright and peaceful, but we cannot blindly disregard our continuing shared capabilities. He likened this situation to that of wearing a seatbelt in a car- where one has a logical intent to drive somewhere without an accident occurring. However, one needs to be prepared for uncertainties, which is why we put our seat belts on. He therefore understands the logical Russian concerns over deploying U.S. missile defenses, in spite of the fact that the United States has no intent to use them against the Russian Federation. It simply would be irresponsible for Russia to not be concerned about this capability. Indeed, each side has plenty of capability, but we would be wrong to not consider potential vulnerabilities. It is our responsibility to work through frustrations and to increase transparency in order for Russia to understand in what circumstances U.S. missile defenses are intended. On the other hand, the United States must try to understand Russia's perceived need for, and reliance upon tactical NWs. The United States needs to be careful, and understand that Russia might have a reliance on tactical NWs that we in the U.S. do not share. But, as with missile defenses, while we do not in the United States perceive that Russia intends to use tactical NWs, we need Russia's help to understand their exact reasoning for relying upon them. Increased transparency on the intent for both systems- missile defense and tactical NWs could allay each side's concerns. Like Dr. Ivanov, he concluded that future treaty negotiations must address more multi-national approach. He added that next round negotiations must also consider non-deployed stockpile NWs, and those awaiting dismantlement. Dr. Ryabikhin also noted that sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will also need to be considered in future negotiations.

Eldridge Colby (speaking in place of Paul Hughes), concluded the session by hypothesizing on issues to consider in future arms control negotiations between the United States and Russia. He predicted that the near-term negotiations will continue to be bilateral, as multilateral candidates are not yet ready to come to the table. He believes that the objectives for future arms control negotiations should not be nuclear abolition *per se*, because it perhaps is not feasible or desirable. He continued that for the near term, nuclear abolition should not drive arms control, as it is distinct from disarmament. Driving the future, goals of strategic stability and the security of NWs and nuclear materials should be the biggest objectives, along with steady reductions in numbers. He maintains that each side should be encouraged, through arms control, to have postures with an assured, devastating 2nd strike capability in order to maintain deterrence. For instance, the United States is in a good position with its ICBMs and Ohio class nuclear submarines. Additionally, the United States could put heavy bombers back on alert if they saw the need. Alternatively, Russia's traditional reliance on silo-based ICBMs puts it in a destabilized position. Russia is trying to address this issue by moving to more road-mobile ICBMs (such as the RS-24). Under the new START treaty, the United States has now been able to see this new system by exhibition. Another mechanism for increasing stability lies in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR included comments on potentially making all ICBMs single warhead-armed- this situation would be more stabilizing from a Russian perspective. However, he notes that while the United States can take such steps that demonstrate good faith in not trying to hinder Russia's deterrent (for example, with proposed missile defense programs), that it is ultimately Russia's responsibility to increase its survivability. Russia, for instance, might consider strengthening its early warning capabilities.

He concluded, like the other panelists, that theater range NWs will need to be considered in future arms control negotiations. Increased transparency in the security of nuclear materials could also help increase mutual confidence building (perhaps through future cooperative threat reduction initiatives). He believes that our continued overarching goals should be to move forward with new arms control activities, but that in doing so each side will need to maintain and assure that they have an effective deterrent. To achieve this, the United States for instance will need to increase its funding for the weapons complex, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and for further developing conventional strike capabilities. This conventional strike capability will not only maintain conventional deterrence, but will provide adequate conventional options for the United States. He also considered whether the United States should explore rebuilding theater range weapons themselves, as they could lend support to allies in limited, regional situations. He concluded noting that overarching goals for future arms control activities should include theater range NWs, increasing security of nuclear materials, and maintaining an effective deterrent.

To begin the question and discussion section, Dr. Ryabikhin asked Dr. Khrupinov (in the audience) what he sees as the main differences between START I and new START, additionally, what issues he feels still remain untouched? Dr. Khrupinov began by noting future arms control negotiations should not dwell in the technicalities. Dr. Khrupinov reflected on the Soviet perspectives of the 1980s through 1992, when he was directly involved in arms control activities (for instance, he helped implement the INF treaty). He noted that what is striking from that period compared to this discussion today is that nothing has changed; the same issues remain on each side. For instance, the concerns of first strike capabilities and the resulting dangers they present for each country are the same concerns from past arms control negotiations. He answered with his own question: why are there still lingering stereotypes and a hidden sense of hostilities between the United States and Russia? Today, it seems the only difference from Cold War sentiments is that the United States and the Russian Federation have become benign adversaries. Each seems poised still to annihilate one another, only today under different conditions and circumstances. Cheating, questions of intent and transparency- all of these issues remain the same as in the past. But he remarked that even at the most initial stages of arms control negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union, there were many fruitful discussions on confidence building measures. The United States had different approaches in how to implement such confidence building measures, for instance, the United States placed a priority of confidence building measures above arms control. But Dr. Khrupinov thinks it would be more feasible to think in terms of the reverse; to first build trust somehow. Today, he sees that negotiators and experts talk about transparency rather than confidence building measures. He believes the time has come for new vision on both, in order to create an effective tool breaking down old stereotypes. We should look into what confidence building measures are possible, since we live in a different world than 30 or more years ago. He encouraged the panel and audience to think of two past success stories that might pave the way. The first was the Bush-Gorbachev unilateral withdrawal of tactical weapons under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991. The second success was the implementation of the INF treaty, which he considers a rather underappreciated feat. Experts should seriously look to how the INF treaty was negotiated, and the trust that existed between each side, as a good template to model for future arms control negotiations. To surmise, he insists that we must not dwell on technicalities of arms control for the future. Rather, we need to consider fresh perspectives on new confidence building measures.

In the second question, an audience member asked the panels to comment on the nature of the political relationship between the United States and Russia today. General George claimed a genuine, large amount of respect between the presidents of each country. Notably, these two presidents are not as bound by Cold War sentiments that previous presidents had to contend with.

He also stated that there appears to be a growing, healthy relationship between the immediate staff of each president. But beyond this, he does note that there remains some reticence in ‘warming-up’ at the government level. However, he remarked that forums such as the Asan Plenum, where people are more comfortable speaking freely and not on behalf of their government, are significantly helping to build relationships.

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